Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. By C. Christine Fair. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. by Roberts, Mark
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 7
Number 4 Volume 7, No. 4, Special
Issue Winter 2014: Future Challenges
in Drone Geopolitics
Article 12
Fighting to the End: The Pakistan
Army’s Way of War. By C.
Christine Fair. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2014.
Mark Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 125-127
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roberts, Mark. "Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. By
C. Christine Fair. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.." Journal
of Strategic Security 7, no. 4 (2014) : 125-127.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.4.11
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss4/12
125 
 
Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. By C. 
Christine Fair. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
ISBN 978-0-19-989270-9. Maps. Tables, Figures. Notes. Sources 
cited. Index. Pp. xv, 347. $34.95. 
 
Since Pakistan’s creation in the 1947 partition that separated it from India, the 
country has been a source of instability in the region. The author states this is 
because Pakistan is driven by a cadre of military officers whose ambitions 
outstrip their capabilities. Given that Islamabad has fought and lost multiple 
wars with India and has close ties with multiple terrorist groups, the guiding 
principles behind Pakistan’s strategic and national security decision making 
processes remain a matter of concern for U.S. policy and strategy makers, as well 
as counterintelligence and counterterrorism professionals.  
 
C. Christine Fair, Ph.D., is one of the foremost South Asia experts. She’s currently 
an Assistant Professor at the Foreign Service school at Georgetown University 
and previously served at the RAND Corporation, the United Nations mission in 
Afghanistan, and the United States Institute of Peace. Her first-hand knowledge 
of the topic makes the book an essential tome for those following South Asia.  
 
The overarching theme of the book is that the Pakistani Army is responsible for 
the Lion’s share of the country’s ills as it drives the country into a seemingly 
endless spiral of poor choices militarily, economically, diplomatically, and in the 
arena of public relations. Dr. Fair thoroughly understands the Pakistani national 
psyche and explains it with extreme clarity. Whereas most countries have an 
army, she correctly posits that Pakistan is in fact an army that has a country to do 
its bidding.  
 
The author used Pakistani defense journals, literature, and doctrine as primary 
her sources for the book. With this insight, she is able to demonstrate 
authoritatively how military doctrine has shaped the entire national security 
perspective for Pakistan. According to their own statements, the Pakistan Army is 
the guardian of the nation’s ideology and culture. Her treatment of the Pakistan 
Army covers the country’s sociology, psychology, anthropology, religious 
trajectory, and military doctrine. Employing such a holistic manner, she deftly 
explains how Pakistan under the control of its army has been, is, and (absent a 
change in trajectory) will remain a destabilizing force to its own detriment, as 
well as that of its neighbors. 
 
When Pakistan and India were rent asunder at the end of the British Empire after 
WWII, India retained most of the territory, governmental infrastructure, 
resources, and institutions left in place by the British. Pakistan, birthed in a 
chaotic environment, had to devise – on the fly - a new national identity, society, 
Roberts: Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. By C. Christ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
126 
 
military, government, infrastructure and culture. Seeking to establish an identity 
completely distinct from that of its larger and more powerful Indian neighbor, 
the Pakistan Army took control of the control and assumed an antagonistic stance 
toward New Delhi, plunging immediately into a war over who would control 
Kashmir.  
 
The author frames the Pakistan Army’s paranoia regarding India and Kashmir as 
more of an ideological issue than a truly security driven one. Due to the 
compulsive desire to match India’s national capabilities, the generals in 
Islamabad will continue to pursue reckless courses of action towards New Delhi. 
The rallying cry has been to pit “Muslim” Pakistan against “Hindu” India, despite 
significant Sikh, Muslim, and Buddhist populations in India, with the Kashmir 
card ever at the ready to be played.  
 
Although Kashmir’s intrinsic value (or lack thereof) as a piece of land has been 
endlessly discussed, Pakistan’s loss framed its relationship with India – eternal 
struggle tinged with envy. Even though Pakistan cannot win in a conventional 
war against India, the army has chosen to engage in guerrilla warfare, proxy 
warfare, terrorism, low intensity conflict, and, despite repeated losses, full scale 
war. India has decisively won every war and sees no need to make any concession 
to Pakistan. Yet the generals in Islamabad still expect New Delhi to yield to their 
demands, which, counterintuitively, grow after every defeat. Although Pakistan 
has not gained one iota of traction, it obsessively seeks equality with India. While 
India has fostered a reasonably successful democratic process with economic 
expansion, Pakistan has gone completely in the other direction, with multiple 
military dictatorships and an economy that needs massive infusions from the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund to subsist. 
 
The Pakistan Army has aggressively pursued a nuclear program in an effort to 
seek some modicum of military parity with India, despite withering international 
sanctions. Due to its support for numerous terrorist groups, Pakistan came very 
close to being declared a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. State Department 
and later was almost declared an enemy combatant after the 9/11 attacks. The 
army dominates foreign, defense, economic, religious and domestic policies. Its 
long-term mismanagement of the country brings to mind Governor Bill Clinton’s 
quip from the 1992 campaign about the meaning of insanity: doing the same 
thing over and over again and expecting a different result. 
 
As Fair outlines the Pakistan Army’s strategic blunders, she suggests that the gap 
between the national capabilities of Pakistan and India will continue to widen in 
New Delhi’s favor.  The longer Islamabad, under the full sway of the Pakistan 
Army defies the consequences of its actions, the harsher the eventual concussion 
will be, whether militarily, economically, or diplomatically. The generals in 
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Islamabad are willing to suffer endless military defeats to seek an unattainable 
advantage vis-à-vis New Delhi and improve their position in Kashmir. This 
mentality leads to an endless spiral of defeat that to the western mind seems 
irrational. 
 
The Pakistan Army controls the state and every apparatus at its disposal, using 
state organs for its own ends. One of the top priorities is serving as the guardian 
and protector of Pakistan’s uniquely Islamic identity. Within this paradigm, the 
struggle with India is framed as a civilizational one, with existential ramifications 
if Islamabad yields to New Delhi. Viewed through this lens, victory is not cast in 
military terms per se (as it is unachievable anyway). Victory is not yielding or 
conceding any point of order to India. This sense of false optimism (or hubris) 
has led to a country run by a military that is revisionist, delusional, and prone to 
initiate conflict as a matter of pride. 
 
Dr. Fair’s book belongs on the shelf of those interested in U.S. strategy, policy or 
military affairs in South Asia. It also essential is for those seeking to understand 
sources of strategic instability in South Asia and how the Pakistan Army’s 
sponsorship of terrorism and warfare will ensure the region remains volatile until 
Islamabad chooses a more rational path. 
 
Mark Roberts 
Roberts: Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. By C. Christ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
